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Abstract 
 
The financial crisis of 2007 was the most difficult challenge the world economy has 
faced since the "Great Depression". While the Great Depression was mainly caused by 
problems in the supply and demand chain or factors from the real economy, the 
financial crisis was caused under the influence of financial innovation and market 
deregulation or purely financial factors. The main goal of this paper is exploring the 
basic causes of the crisis through a fundamental historical analysis. A central role in 
the story is given to the moral hazard which in fact, is a basic factor of the financial 
crisis. Moral hazard is a behavioral problem and a form of position abuse in order to 
gain personal benefit while transferring the risk of failure to another party. The research 
was conducted by explanation of this risk, highlighting its role, by identifying him in a 
number of historical events that preceded and directly caused the financial crisis. 
Analyzing all of this emerges an overall conclusion that the crisis was caused under a 
huge influence of the moral hazard, which means that with better management of this 
risk, the crisis could have been avoided. This leads to a confirmation of the need for 
further research on the problem called - moral hazard, and general to the asymmetric 
information problem. Further knowledge in this field allows us to prevent the 
occurrence of similar crises. As George Soros said “Once we realize that imperfect 
understanding is human condition there is no shame in being wrong, only in failing to 
correct our mistakes”. This is actually one of the main objectives of this labor – to learn 
from the past in order to prevent similar events in the future. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The huge level of development in the information and communication technology enables fast 
transfer of information from one end of the world to another in a split of a second. We can say 
that today the physical borders between countries are almost gone. It is a fact that 
globalization allows seamless transmission of all the positive effects generated worldwide. 
While the transfer of the benefits would be considered useful, it must be noted that the process 
is not selective, so it transmits both the positive and the negative effects. Economic 
globalization refers to the increasing economic interdependence of national economies around 
the world by the rapid growth of cross-border movements of goods, services, technology and 
capital. Globalization could be seen as a positive or a negative phenomenon, depending on 
the effect that transfers from one country to another, ie globally.  
 On the other hand everything in the economy is based on decisions (to invest or not to increase 
capacity or not; to lay off employees or not). The globalization transmits the effects of the 
decisions worldwide. So whether we are talking about transmission of a good or bad decision 
we could characterize the globalization as good or bad. 
All this leads to the conclusion that there is a connection between information and decision-
making in the economic sphere, and the globalization acts as an amplifier of the created 
effects. Thus, if information cause adopting positive decisions ie growth, globalization would 
render that growth global, but if there is a crisis, it would hit the world. The most common 
problem that affects the quality of information is called asymmetric information. It is a situation 
where market participants have different information and/or a different amount of information. 
Asymmetric information, in terms of timing, impact before or after the period in which the 
decision was made. When the impact is before, we are talking about adverse selection and if 
the problem occurs after the decision, then there is moral hazard. The best example of the 
danger resulting from wrong decisions, ie the asymmetric information is the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. The complexity of human psychology, shown by desire for profit, success and 
achieving rapid growth in a short period is strongly pronounced. So, using all its power, the 
financial world acted to eliminate all obstacles (deregulation) to meet the aforementioned 
human characteristics. This has created a field where you like it or not, reign moral hazard, 
where every success is individual, and each fall belongs to the system. Globalisation however, 
was here to amplify this process and translate it into financial crisis, which further passed into 
world economic crisis, the worst since the "Great Depression". 
The main method used in this paper is the historical analysis. In addition certain qualitative 
and quantitative methods are used, in order to valorize the historical events. Primary data 
derived from numerous academic articles, journals, books and the databases of the biggest 
electronic economical web portals. The conclusions are given on the base of descriptive and 
inductive-deductive analysis. Using these methods and data to analyze the economic events 
that preceded the crisis brings to fore the presence of the moral hazard which means that with 
better management of this risk the crisis could have been avoided. 
 
2.  Мoral hazard 
 
The moral hazard problem is arising as a result of the asymmetric information. As of the timing, 
this problem occurs after the transaction is done. There are numerous examples in which we 
may explain the presence of the moral hazard. As an example we can take the behavior of a 
person who has insured his car. After the conclusion of the insurance, it can be expected that 
the person's attention to the vehicle safety will be smaller, simply because he knows that if 
something happens, the risk will be transferred to the insurance company. In other words, 
moral hazard demonstrates the will of a certain individual to take risk (high risk), which in 
normal circumstances He would avoid, simply because He knows that someone else will suffer 
the negative consequences, if they occur [1]. The recognition of moral hazard is very 
complicated thing, because of the subjective character it has. Proving the presence of the 
moral hazard exactly, based on the historical events as examples, can be almost impossible, 
primarily because there is no confirmation of any person who legally was sanctioned as a 
result of It. However, understanding the basics of this problem is of great importance, in order 
to take measures for its reduction. 
 
 
1.1 The impact of the moral hazard on the banking system 
 
 
The basis of all banking operations is trust. The emergence of asymmetric information in this 
sector drastically distorts it, which may result with a bank panic. The bank panic itself is not 
an irrational event. It is an event that occurs when the public receives information about certain 
irregularity. The bank run arises from potential problems that banks have, not vice versa, the 
 problems to arise from the bank runs [2]. Bank panics, as history shows, can be a serious 
problem for the financial system of a country, but also can cause global instability. For this 
reason, the regulatory authorities have always tried to control individuals and activities related 
to financial intermediation. Their fundamental purpose is to protect public funds and the 
confidence in the financial system [3]. 
The impact of moral hazard on banking operations can be divided into two parts: (1) the impact 
on the traditional banking activities, and (2) the impact on the financial innovation. 
 Traditional banking activities are based on accepting deposits and approving loans. 
The moral hazard problem appears after the conclusion of the loan contract in which 
the bank as a lender is the one that can lose. This means that the bank, its 
management, and its shareholders are the ones who should take appropriate 
protective measures. There is a famous quote "if you owe 100 thousand dollars to your 
bank, you are in big trouble....but if you owe $ 100 million, then your bank is in big 
trouble" [4]. The appearance and the strength of the moral hazard depend on many 
variables that the bank can control directly, indirectly or cannot control. Factors that 
have impact on the moral hazard are: the interest rate, competition and 
regulation/deregulation. The variation in the values of these indicators can dictate 
bank's exposure to moral hazard, which also has influence on the other banking risks. 
 Joseph Schumpeter said that capitalism thrives on innovation, by introducing new 
processes and technologies that override the old one [5]. According to this the financial 
engineering is the pillar for development of the financial system. Through this process 
new financial instruments are created - called financial derivatives. Financial 
derivatives, although relatively new phenomenon (dating from 1980), reached values 
that exceeded the value of their base instruments (end of 2007 the total assets of 
commercial banks in the US was $11.1 trillion, and the contract value of off-balance 
sheet derivatives reached $164.8 trillion) [6]. Despite the fact that the financial 
derivatives flooded the market, they were not subjected to any regulation, for a simple 
reason that the regulatory authorities believed that derivates are operated only by the 
large financial institutions, which staff has high quality so regulation would be totally 
unnecessary. The authorities not only that believed that people working for big financial 
institutions involved in the trading of derivatives have the expertise and conscientious 
to act in a manner  best for the system, but also were strongly opposed to any attempt 
to regulate this market. "The regulation of derivatives transactions concluded between 
professionals themselves is unnecessary," said Alan Greenspan (Chairman of FED 
1987-2006), and the attempt to regulate the derivatives market by Brooksley Born, 
(who at that time was the President of Commodity Futures Trading Commission) ended 
unsuccessfully, after being contacted by Lawrence Summers, (who at the time was the 
Secretary of the Treasury) with the words: "I have 13 bankers in my office and they 
said if you continue with this, we will create the biggest crisis since World War II." This 
directly influenced on the creation of conditions suitable for the emergence of moral 
hazard. This means that the instruments originally designed to reduce risk, were 
transformed into a major source of problems such as the moral hazard.  
 
 
1.2 The moral hazard and the financial crisis 2007 
 
The financial crisis has caused many to question, why rating agencies and regulatory 
authorities never saw the danger? The banks were holding huge amount of risky financial 
instruments. Did no one saw the danger? In fact, the crisis was seen by many, but what no 
one saw was its size. Almost no one could have guessed that it would be a world banking 
system crisis, which would seriously disrupt the financial system and trigger a global economic 
crisis. The key to the easiest explanation of this lies in moral hazard. Theoretically, the moral 
hazard problem should easily be prevented, but in the real world we are talking about an 
incurable disease of the modern financial world. Why moral hazard is an insoluble enigma of 
 modern finance? The answer lies in what economists call the principal-agent problem. In large 
companies today (including financial institutions), we have a separation between ownership 
and management. Principals engage other people - agents who act as managers and should 
pursue their behavior in a best way, in favor of principal interests. Unfortunately, almost 
always, the agents are directly involved in all activities and know more than the principals. It 
is naturally for humans to care more about themselves, so the agents often care more about 
their own interests, which may lead to destructive effects. Principal-agent problem is further 
increased with the increased high of power, something that was characteristic for the financial 
world before the outbreak of the crisis. This was made possible through the process of 
deregulation which was conducted under great pressure and lobbying by banks on the 
regulatory authorities and the political factor. Thus they created large financial institutions that 
were allowed to make a high concentrated market thoughout the debt-securitization process, 
generating a huge amount of debt on the way. A financial crisis in its pure form is an exit from 
bank debt. Such an exit can cause a massive deleveraging of the financial system. It is not 
the asset side of banks which is the problem but the liability side [2]. This huge financial 
institutions considered themselves “too big to fail” so they engaged riskier operations knowing 
that the government security net will have to bail them out if they get confronted with problems. 
The problem of dealing with “too big to fail” financial institutions is not a new one in financial 
policy, but the severity of the global economic and financial crisis that started in 2007 has put 
a spotlight on it like never before [7]. 
Knowing all that has been mentioned, It is not hard to conclude that the smallest mistake would 
cause a systemic collapse, and with the real danger of a principal-agent problem, making a 
mistake was inevitable. In other words this means that the system was able to function as long 
as the mortgage backed credit debtors were finding a way to pay their installments or as long 
as the music was playing. The housing market was clearly a huge “bubble” as the prices were 
in a rapid growth. This was not based on real indicators but on speculations. We are talking 
about a situation where the price of the assets differs from their fundamental market value [8]. 
At that time the world economy was in expansion. Economic booms can create their own 
economic climate, making it very difficult for those operating within the bubble to formulate 
objective measures of the fair value of assets and therefore the sustainable level of credit [9]. 
So it was hard for the financial analysts and regulators to imagine that there was a bubble and 
they were not prepared for the possibility of a crisis. On the other side it was obvious that the 
debtors could not meet their obligations if the rates change, simply because most of them 
were not creditworthy.  
 
 
Chart 1 USA Home price Index  
 
The securities based on these mortgage loans were receiving high ratings from the rating 
agencies (about 60% were AAA). The high ratings can be explained by the fact that the rating 
agencies main goal is to gain profit so if they don’t meet banks demand and give the wanted 
ratings, the competition would certainly do. This is just another evidence for the presence of 
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 the moral hazard. As the crisis was beginning to emerge there were a lot of denials by 
politicians and financial experts which lead to slow reactions that strengthen the crisis. History 
indicates that the way financial crises are managed and resolved can deeply influence 
subsequent economic performance. The response can affect the length of the slump, the 
speed and strength of the subsequent recovery and, it all probability, the long-term growth 
rate too [10]. All of this lead to a financial meltdown which caused a global economic crises. 
Amid highly deregulated system, the bank management can engage operations that are riskier 
than what a bank should take over. Through the process of securitization (repackaging of 
loans with generally predictable cash flows into interest-bearing securities with marketable 
investment characteristics), banks were able to collect additional funds, which were 
immediately reinvested [11]. Bank debt grew rapidly, but the high profits, blinded the bankers, 
regulators, and the majority of analysts, financial experts and market gurus. They thought that 
it was almost impossible for the market to collapse. Some of them were unable to see the 
crisis even when it started. One of the most infamous statements comes from Donald Luskin, 
a market guru and a financial analyst, who on September 14, 2008 in The Washington Post 
said: "Things today just aren't that bad. Sure, there are trouble spots in the economy, as the 
government takeover of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and jitters about Wall 
Street firm Lehman Brothers, amply demonstrate. And unemployment figures are up a bit, too. 
None of this, however, is cause for depression -- or exaggerated Depression comparisons." 
The next day Lehman Brothers collapsed and the crisis officially begun. When we defined the 
moral hazard we mentioned that it is a phenomenon which is very easy to be defined in theory, 
but very difficult to prove in practice. As mentioned, the problem lies in the principal-agent 
theory. Agents (in our case managers at major banks) were those who abused their position 
taking huge amount of risk, believing that the institutions are simply too big to fail and in the 
worst case scenario the shareholders and depositors are those who will lose. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.” - Donald Rumsfeld. This 
leads to thinking: what are the known knowns, what could be known unknowns and is it 
possible to assume the unknown unknowns? But what if we are wrong? What if all belongs to 
the third group? What would be then the cost of our ignorance? Taking into account what we 
talked through previous pages, we can conclude that we know the importance of information 
in order to make the right decision, we are aware of the existence of asymmetric information 
and we know the moral hazard. However, despite our knowledge, we managed to get 
ourselves in a recession caused exactly by the mentioned phenomena. Is the moral hazard 
the main cause of the financial crisis is the question that everyone, impatiently would ask? 
Yes, moral hazard is one of the fundamental causes of the financial crisis. However, the 
reason for the financial crisis as well is our ignorance about this problem. Also the reason for 
the financial crisis can be our blindness to realize human greed. As Mahatma Gandhi said 
”The world has enough for everyone's need, but not enough for everyone's greed”. This carry 
us to a conclusion that the cause of the financial crisis is that "we do not know that we do not 
know" how to manage the moral hazard risk.  
The financial crisis devastated the world economy causing millions of people to lose their jobs, 
homes, savings and some of them their lives. It is clear that the greed of some caused pain to 
millions. Sadly the moral hazard problem can hardly be legally prosecuted. As a result of this 
none was conducted so the people who caused the crisis left the “ring” with their pockets full 
of money. Albert Einstein said “The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by 
those who watch them without doing anything”. Therefore it is clear that we need to change 
the rules and implement regulations that will prevent the occurrence of moral hazard. A well 
tailored government regulation can mitigate the impact of such excesses (bubbles) and is 
absolutely necessary to protect the public. The crisis was created by humans, and what is 
 created by humans can be only changed by humans. So a final conclusion is that further study 
is needed on this issue. Only thus we could learn a lesson from the past and prevent a similar 
situation in the future. 
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